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This submission on the development of the 2013 Defence White Paper 
addresses briefly four aspects: 
 
1. The structure and content of the White Paper itself 
2. Australia’s strategic environment 
3. Australia’s military strategy 
4. Force structure 
 
 
1. Structure and content of the White Paper 
 
a) The purpose of the White Paper needs to be well understood: to 
establish and explain Australia’s defence policy, military strategy and 
force structure plans to the Government and policy communities, members 
of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian people. This 
may seem an obvious point to make, but it is important. After the 2009 
White Paper implicitly identified China as the leading source of 
regional instability a significant degree of public criticism ensued, 
including from several former senior diplomats and from China itself. 
There will no doubt be pressure placed upon drafters of the 2013 White 
Paper to produce a more banal, less meaningful document to avoid such 
criticisms. That would be a mistake, for three reasons. 
 
First, the 2009 White Paper’s judgement on China was realistic, 
measured and strategically sound. Second, Defence White Papers should 
not be viewed as fulfilling a primarily diplomatic purpose. To do so 
would undermine the main purpose outlined above. Third, Australia is an 
open Western liberal democracy: Government owes the public (and ADF 
personnel) its honest appraisal of the strategic environment and 
potential threats to Australia and to regional stability. Policy 
documents must not be tailored to appease foreign governments, and 
particularly not a distinctly unfriendly totalitarian one. 
 
b) The White Paper shouldn’t try to be too comprehensive. Some 
commentators criticised the 2009 White Paper for its lack of detailed 
budget analysis and plans. These are important aspects of the defence 
planning process and public debate, but needn’t be part of the White 
Paper document itself. Likewise, sections on management, personnel, 
support etc could easily be excised and produced as subsidiary 
documents, allowing the White Paper to focus more sharply on the most 
essential elements of policy, strategy and force structure. 
 
c) Australia’s strategic lexicon has been employed inconsistently over 
time and even within single documents. More care needs to be taken with 
the use of strategic concepts and terminology, such as ‘defence self 
reliance’ and ‘primary operational environment.’ For the sake of 
clarity, in certain cases the use of contested or ambiguous terminology 
should cease altogether. 
 
2. Australia’s strategic environment 
 
d) Some opinion has asserted that Australia’s strategic situation has 
changed significantly since the release of Force 2030 in 2009. On the 
contrary, there have been no major strategic discontinuities. The so-
called American ‘pivot to Asia,’ whilst more substantive than mere 
political symbolism, nevertheless hardly represents a major new 
realignment; rather it is a return to trend following the winding down 
of post-9/11 imbroglios in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States, and 
particularly the U.S. Navy-dominated Pacific Command, has never lost 
its focus on maintaining stability in maritime East Asia.  
 
e) Too much analysis of the strategic environment has been excessively, 
and simplistically, materialistic in nature: e.g., comparing and second 
guessing regional military force structures and capabilities. The 
underlying trend, dominated by a rising, non-status quo, increasingly 
combative China, and the response to that unwelcome phenomenon, has 
been a consistent and well documented process for the best part of two 
decades. Assumed material advances in the PLA armoury in recent times 
only enhance, but do not substantively alter, that trend.  
 
f) The serious fiscal constraints currently negatively affecting 
Defence are unlikely to be long lasting, simply because the dynamic, 
unstable and increasingly dangerous regional security situation will 
demand a strengthened ADF rather than a more modest one over the medium 
term. 
 
3. Australia’s military strategy 
 
g) Force 2030 and earlier Defence policy documents all suffer from a 
common problem. The security environment, Australia’s interests and 
vague concepts of military strategy in the 2009 White Paper were 
generally sound enough; yet Force 2030 then flowed directly to detailed 
force structure plans. A major step in the process leading to the 
formulation of force structure was missing: that of the specific tasks 
that the joint force must be capable of conducting at the tactical and 
operational levels of warfare in order to deliver strategic effect. Or, 
in other words, what strategic effects should the ADF be capable of 
generating to operationalize the military strategy in service of the 
policy and national interest frameworks set out in the White Paper? A 
clear development of this aspect would better demonstrate the strategic 
rationale for particular force structure decisions.  
 
h) The inherently maritime geography of our region is as widely 
recognized as it is poorly understood. The sea first and foremost is a 
medium for mobility. That can be of great advantage to Australia. The 
longstanding view of the northern archipelagos as presenting physical 
air and sea ‘gaps’ to be defended is a prime example of such 
misunderstanding. The maritime environment is a vast manoeuvre space 
for the joint force. To take advantage of our favourable geostrategic 
circumstances we need a Defence Force which is highly mobile and 
capable of operating over the great distances of the western Pacific 
and Indian Ocean theatres of operation. As the Chief of Navy has 
astutely recognized, Australia’s strategic approach should be neither 
continentalist nor expeditionary, but maritime, for the joint force.    
 
i) Those who prefer to focus on short-range air and subsurface forces 
to deny enemy access to the continent itself would severely limit the 
capability, flexibility and utility of the joint force. It is 
recognized that some spruik such a strategy and consequential force 
structure at least implicitly to constrain the options of future 
governments, specifically by limiting the ability of the ADF to 
contribute to potential U.S. operations in defence of its allies and 
the existing geopolitical order in East Asia. It would be both 
dangerous and irresponsible to intentionally hamstring future ADF 
capabilities. Not only does Australia have a direct and vital national 
stake in the maintenance of a U.S.-led regional and world order, but we 
also cannot predict the circumstances in which the application of the 
ADF may be required, even in the near-term future, let alone in 2030 or 
2050.    
 
4. Force  structure 
 
j) No substantive, detailed rationale has ever been provided to the 
public on why particular force structure decisions have been made, 
particularly those costing many billions of dollars. Are we expected to 
accept at face value, for example, that 100 combat aircraft or twelve 
submarines are somehow ‘magic’ force structure numbers? Defence needs 
to explain, whether in the White Paper or elsewhere, and within the 
constraints of publicly releasable information, the rationale for such 
decisions. 
 
k) It has been increasingly common for some Government officials and 
even senior ADF officers to argue for certain decisions on the basis of 
‘efficiency.’ This is inappropriate. Obviously, military capability 
must be developed within budgetary constraints, but capability is 
developed to provide strategic effect, not efficiency in the 
business/management school sense. Evaluation of capability thus must be 
on the basis of military effectiveness, not efficiency: i.e., can it do 
the job asked of it in times of crisis? An example may be the Air Force 
preference for a single type, all F-35 Joint Strike Fighter air combat 
force. Although F-35 capabilities are classified, we do know that many 
of its reputed advantages derive from its stealth and network centric 
warfare (NCW) capabilities. Yet, if a potential adversary could 
effectively counter stealth and NCW (hardly inconceivable), how 
effective would the aircraft then be? No doubt a single type would be 
more ‘efficient’ in simple management terms; but would it necessarily 
be more militarily effective? Perhaps a combined F-35 and F/A-18F/EA-
18G force would be more flexible, redundant and effective after all?  
 
l) The need for a long-range, high endurance maritime-focused strategy 
has been established above; as has also the need to establish the types 
of strategic effects demanded by defence policy and strategy before 
determining medium-term force structure decisions. In that context, it 
would be useful to distinguish between essential and second order 
capabilities. Take the future submarine, for example: it will need to 
have the range and endurance to be able to undertake antisubmarine 
warfare, anti-shipping, and intelligence gathering tasks in a vast arc 
across the Indo-Pacific area, from Northeast Asian waters to the 
Persian Gulf. Less essential, aspirational capabilities which could be 
deleted from plans are land attack (due to Tomahawk’s cost and very 
limited bang for buck) and special forces insertion.  
 
m) Much focus has been given to ‘jointness,’ especially in the context 
of the upcoming LHD capability. This is understandable and necessary, 
but it must also be understood that each Service must first and 
foremost be master of their own primary operating environment, whether 
that be land, sea or air. 
 
The existing White Paper framework does not need radical surgery, just 
more focus and clarity. 
